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DEALING WITH THE PAST IN A POST-CONFLICT SOCIETY:
DOES THE PARTICIPATION OF WOMEN MATTER?
INSIGHTS FROM NORTHERN IRELAND

CATHERINE O’ROURKE*
INTRODUCTION
I. WOMEN’S PARTICIPATION AND TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE:
CLAIMS OF PROCESS OR SUBSTANCE?
II. WHY DOES WOMEN’S PARTICIPATION MATTER? MAPPING
CLAIMS IN THEORY
III. WHY DOES WOMEN’S PARTICIPATION MATTER? MAPPING
CLAIMS IN WOMEN’S ACTIVISM
IV. “AM I THAT NAME?” WOMEN IN THE REPORT OF THE
CONSULTATIVE GROUP ON THE PAST
V. A WAY FORWARD? ENGENDERING THE PAST, NORTHERN
IRELAND AND BEYOND
A. The Justice Claim: A Politics of Presence and the Need
for Women’s Participation
B. The Different Agenda Claim: A Politics of Ideas and
Articulating What Women Can Contribute
C. The Politics of Care Claim: A Feminist Politics of the
Female Body
D. The Larger Dream Claim: A Feminist Politics of
Difference and Democracy
INTRODUCTION
I believe that dealing with the past is very important
for women—important because it has also to do with
what is made visible in the past . . . . It touches
another theme, which is to what extent are women
political subjects. If you don’t recognize women as
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organized by the Women’s Resource and Development Agency and Hanna’s House in
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Katie Skeehan for referencing and proofreading. Mistakes which remain are my own.
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political subjects in the past, historically, they will
not be recognized in the present.1
[W]omen were not recognised for their roles and
experiences throughout the conflict and therefore
their invisibility cannot but be mirrored in the
post-conflict structures. We expect the structures
proposed to deal with the legacy of the past take
this as their starting point and seek to address
this gross inequality.2
This article is concerned with the participation of women in
dealing with the past, both as a priority for women’s movements and
as a practical matter for transitional justice processes. The article
aims both to describe and critique a particular set of texts—primarily
the 2009 Report of the Consultative Group on the Past in Northern
Ireland (the Report),3 but also the documentary interventions made
by local women’s organizations into that Report—as well as to open
up critical space for similar projects in other areas. Fundamentally,
the article asks: does the participation of women matter in dealing
with the past? And if so, what difference does it make? I draw principally on feminist political theory on the participation of women in
politics, as well as gender scholarship on conflict and transitional
justice, as a theoretical framework for this analysis. I want to focus
less on debating the merits of such theoretical positions, and more
on how their interventions can be useful in analyzing a specific case.
The first part of the article offers a context for why women’s participation has emerged as central to both women’s movement demands in transitional justice and in policy responses in the area. In
Part II, the article then synthesizes the key theoretical claims made
in favor of women’s increased participation in politics, namely justice, different agenda, politics of care, and the larger dream, and
identifies them as claims of both process and substance. Part II also
extends these claims by analogy to claims for women’s participation
in official processes to deal with the past. The third and fourth parts
of the article outline, respectively, the context of official efforts in
1. Interview with Lorena Fries, Dir., Chilean Nat’l Inst. Of Human Rights, in
Santiago, Chile (Oct. 27, 2008).
2. ETAIN O’KANE, A RESPONSE TO DEALING WITH THE PAST IN NORTHERN IRELAND:
THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE CONSULTATIVE GROUP ON THE PAST 27 (2009).
3. ROBIN EAMES ET AL., CONSULTATIVE GROUP ON THE PAST, REPORT OF THE CONSULTATIVE GROUP ON THE PAST IN NORTHERN IRELAND (2009) [hereinafter REPORT OF THE
CONSULTATIVE GROUP ON THE PAST].
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Northern Ireland to deal with the past and women’s movement interventions into dealing with the past and the prominence of claims for
women’s participation therein. I contend that demands for women’s
participation in dealing with the past—rather than being grounded
in equality claims about the justice requirements of women’s equal
participation—are predominantly linked to consequentialist claims
about the substantive outcomes that women’s participation will bring
to dealing with the past. These consequentialist claims may prove
effective in terms of holding diverse women and women’s organizations together in their interventions into official processes to deal
with the past. The article describes, however, the very limited traction that these claims have achieved in an official process that is
largely disinterested in the substantive outcomes that women’s participation is said to guarantee. I argue that the conflation of participation as a question of process—that women should, as a matter of
justice, be involved in related decision-making—with participation
as a guarantee of substance—that women’s participation will lead
to a certain set of predetermined outcomes—is both problematic in
theory and unhelpful in terms of feminist politics. I conclude by proposing a novel third way that acknowledges a tentative, though dynamic and evolving, relationship between women’s participation as
process and substantive outcomes in dealing with the past, while continuing to ground calls for women’s participation within justice claims.
I. WOMEN’S PARTICIPATION AND TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE:
CLAIMS OF PROCESS OR SUBSTANCE?
The term “transitional justice” has come to encompass a range
of legal and quasi-legal mechanisms designed to deliver accountability and redress for past human rights violations in states emerging
from sustained periods of political violence.4 Initiatives such as international trials, truth commissions, and reparations are increasingly
prominent and standardized in the aftermath of mass human rights
violations.5 Transitional justice is now big business, bringing with
it substantial international energy, attention, and resources to postconflict and post-authoritarian states.6 With the expansion of the
practice and funding of transitional justice, the objectives assigned
4. See, e.g., HAMBER ET AL., PAST IMPERFECT: DEALING WITH THE PAST IN NORTHERN
IRELAND AND SOCIETIES IN TRANSITION (1998) (presenting papers that discuss accountability issues surrounding dealing with the past in post-conflict Northern Ireland).
5. See, e.g., INT’L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, DONOR STRATEGIES FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: TAKING STOCK AND MOVING FORWARD 4 (2007) (summarizing the remarks
of Shahid Malik).
6. See id. at 1.
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to transitional justice initiatives have similarly grown.7 Transitional
justice mechanisms and processes were initially attached to more
modest objectives: baseline documentation and minimum forms of
accountability for a limited number of perpetrators addressing a
small number of victims.8 Contemporary transitional justice activity, however, aspires to a much broader set of transformative societal objectives, including reconciliation,9 economic redistribution,10
and the establishment of a functioning system of rule of law in fragile states.11 The global expansion of transitional justice activity is
occurring at the same time as growing international recognition and
institutionalization of the need for a gender perspective in conflict
and post-conflict activities, most notably through the Women, Peace
and Security (WPS) agenda initiated by United Nations Security
Council Resolution 1325 (the Resolution).12 This confluence of transitional justice expansion and the WPS agenda is motivating a dramatic broadening of feminist objectives in transitional justice.13
Whereas transitional justice activity motivated little feminist concern or engagement in the paradigmatic transitions of the Latin
American Southern Cone,14 it is now an area of concerted feminist
analysis,15 policy,16 and activism.17 Feminist ambitions in transitional
justice range from the modest to the transformative. At a minimum,
7. See id.
8. As classically articulated by Chilean President Patricio Aylwin, “justice so far as
possible.” CYNTHIA BROWN, AMERICAS WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE “POLITICS OF
AGREEMENTS”: CHILE DURING PRESIDENT AYLWIN’S FIRST YEAR 5 ( 1991).
9. See, e.g., BRANDON HAMBER, TRANSFORMING SOCIETIES AFTER POLITICAL VIOLENCE:
TRUTH, RECONCILIATION, AND MENTAL HEALTH 153–62 (2009).
10. See Transitional Justice and Development, INT’L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE,
http://ictj.org/our-work/research/transitional-justice-and-development (last visited Nov. 6,
2012).
11. See, e.g., U.N. Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in
Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies: Rep. of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. S/2004/616
(Aug. 23, 2004).
12. S.C. Res. 1325, ¶¶ 1–18, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1325 (Oct. 31, 2000) [hereinafter S.C.
Res. 1325].
13. See, e.g., Joint Statement—Femmes Africa Solidarité, WILPF & World YWCA:
Effective Remedies for Conflict Related Sexual Violence, WOMEN’S INT’L LEAGUE FOR PEACE
& FREEDOM (July 5, 2012), http://www.wilpfinternational.org/statement-effective-remedies
-for-conflict-related-sexual-violence [hereinafter Joint Statement].
14. Catherine O’Rourke, Transitioning to What? Transitional Justice and Gendered
Citizenship in Chile and Colombia, in GENDER IN TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 136, 145
(Susanne Buckley-Zistel & Ruth Stanley eds., 2011).
15. See Christine Bell & Catherine O’Rourke, Does Feminism Need a Theory of Transitional Justice? An Introductory Essay, 1 INT’L J. OF TRANSITIONAL JUST. 23, 28 (2007).
16. For example, the United Nations has recently reorganized its gender work to increase emphasis and expertise on issues of post-conflict justice. “Women, War and Peace”
is now one of the five focus areas of UN Women. Women, War & Peace, UN WOMEN,
http://www.unifem.org/gender_issues/women_war_peace/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2012).
17. See, e.g., Joint Statement, supra note 13.
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feminists have intervened to ensure that transitional justice processes “do no harm” and do not expose women to further trauma.18
A recurrent challenge is holding onto the perverse equality gains of
war.19 Disruptive periods of political violence are typically accompanied by the loosening of social strictures around gender roles.20 For
example, the absence of men in a community can provide new space
for women’s community leadership (and, indeed, household leadership).21 The principle of “do no harm” also means avoiding a return
to more restrictive and iniquitous gender roles that preceded violent
conflict.22 More optimistic interventions by feminists seek the recognition, documentation, and even a measure of accountability for the
harms experienced by women in contexts of political violence.23 Thus,
dealing with the past is now broadly recognized by gender theorists,
policymakers, and women’s movements as holding important implications for women and for gender relations in transitional societies.
Of particular concern in this article is the commitment to affirm
and advance the participation of women in processes to deal with the
past that is embedded within the WPS agenda and broader women’s
equality objectives in transitional justice.24 Given that transitional
justice processes are undertaken in contexts of formerly (or sometimes persistently) violently divided societies, the degree of consensus amongst women’s organizations and movements about the need
for women’s participation in these processes is striking. Irrespective
of how deeply entrenched ethnic and other divisions are amongst
women, the demand for the participation of women achieve remarkably broad support from women. Locally, conflicts are characterized
by a “meta-conflict”—that is, “multiple disagreements over what kind
of conflict it is, and about whether it is ‘one’ or ‘many.’ ” 25 Different
meta-conflict stances will be underwritten by different experiences
of the conflict and will produce differing ideas as to the necessary
18. See, e.g., VASUKI NESIAH ET AL., INT’L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, TRUTH COMMISSIONS AND GENDER: PRINCIPLES, POLICIES, AND PROCEDURES, 20–21 (2006) (explaining
the process of taking statements from victims to ensure victims are not retraumatized).
19. Julie Mertus, Improving the Status of Women in the Wake of War: Overcoming
Structural Obstacles, 41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L. L. 541, 555 (2003).
20. Id.
21. See id. at 543.
22. See Mertus, supra note 19, at 544.
23. See Fionnuala Ní Aoláin & Catherine Turner, Gender, Truth & Transition, 16
UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 229, 246–47 (2007).
24. See, e.g., Catherine O’Rourke, Women, Peace and Security: Does the Participation
of Women Matter?, Presentation at the University of Minnesota Law School Symposium: Gendering Conflict and Post-Conflict Terrains: New Challenges and Opportunities
(May 18, 2012).
25. JOHN MCGARRY & BRENDAN O’LEARY, EXPLAINING NORTHERN IRELAND: BROKEN
IMAGES 1 (1995).
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ingredients for resolving the conflict.26 Feminist theoretical engagement with post-structuralism,27 and internal feminist critique of silenced dissident voices,28 demonstrate that to suggest the existence
of a uniform women’s experience of conflict is at best naive, or at
worst, despotic. To pose a feminist consensus around the nature of
harms experienced by women in conflict would conceal a range of
internal disagreements and implicit hierarchies about what harms
matter. Predictably, therefore, there is no unified feminist theoretical
or political perspective about either the nature or causes of women’s
experiences of conflict.29 Rather, translating women’s diverse experience of conflict into feminist theory and strategy for dealing with the
past is an inherently political activity that reveals a range of prior
political commitments. These prior political commitments pertain
chiefly to whether gender is understood as causal, or as significant,
or as incidental to the motivation for harms experienced by women
in conflict. The role afforded to gender in determining conflict has
profound implications for building a feminist political and legal
strategy to ensure the necessary ingredients to resolve conflict. To
illustrate, feminist approaches to dealing with the past could privilege the private sphere and women’s private experiences of harm,
without reference to the context of conflict violence. Alternatively,
conflict violence might be placed at the center of women’s experiences, and conflict harms privileged. Gender relations of the society
might be understood as the single most important determining factor
in how a woman experiences conflict. On the other hand, relations
between men and women might be understood as only one of a range
of important factors influencing a woman’s experience of harm, and
secondary to the underlying ethnic, ideological, or resource-based
causes of conflict. Transitional justice mechanisms are overt sites of
meta-conflict negotiations.30 Women in conflict situations will not
stand outside this meta-conflict, but they will instead reflect it—
albeit in ways that are different from those of men. As Bell and I
have argued elsewhere, “[t]he feminist emphasis on the participation of women needs also to be understood as a response to the problems of articulating common political goals in the context of deeply
26. Id.
27. See, e.g., FEMINISM/POSTMODERNISM (Linda Nicholson ed., 1990).
28. See Valerie Amos & Prabha Parmar, Challenging Imperial Feminism, 17 FEMINIST
REV. 3 (1984).
29. For an overview of different feminist approaches to epistemology and “standpoint,”
see SANDRA HARDING, WHOSE SCIENCE? WHOSE KNOWLEDGE? THINKING FROM WOMEN’S
LIVES (1990).
30. See, e.g., Christine Bell, Dealing with the Past in Northern Ireland, 26 FORDHAM
INT’L. L.J. 1095, 1145 (2003).
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entrenched differences amongst women, both locally and across
global divides.” 31
The absence of an easy feminist agreement on the content of a
“women’s agenda” in transitional justice has resulted in a focus on
process: women agree that they should at least be included in the institutions and practice of transitional justice. The extent of the policy traction that this demand for women’s participation has received
is illustrated most vividly, though not exclusively, in the first operative provision of the Resolution, which “[u]rges Member States to ensure increased representation of women at all decision-making levels
in national, regional and international institutions and mechanisms
for the prevention, management, and resolution of conflict . . . .” 32
This policy traction is further illustrated in the subsequent
UNSC resolutions addressed to the Women, Peace and Security
agenda, all of which call for the increased participation of women in
the processes and institutions of peace and security.33 Moreover,
“Leadership and Participation” is one of the six focus areas of UN
Women.34 The policy focus on participation reflects an understanding of participation as a question of process that women should by
right be included within transitional justice processes and institutions. Nevertheless, the focus on participation raises questions of
substance: what difference does the participation of women make to
such processes and institutions?
II. WHY DOES WOMEN’S PARTICIPATION MATTER?
MAPPING CLAIMS IN THEORY
Calls for women’s participation in politics are grounded in at
least four broad claims about why women’s participation matters,
namely the justice claim, the different agenda claim, the politics of
care claim, and the “larger dream” claim. These claims have received
extensive examination and reflection from feminist political theorists and all have relevance to calls for women’s participation in dealing with the past and why it matters. This section explains these
claims in terms of feminist political theory and applies them to calls
for women’s participation in dealing with the past.
31. Bell & O’Rourke, supra note 15, at 31.
32. S.C. Res. 1325, supra note 12, ¶ 11.
33. S.C. Res. 1889, ¶¶ 1, 4, 6, 11, 14, 15, 18–19, 19b, 19d, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1889 (Oct. 5,
2009); S.C. Res. 1888, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1888 (Sept. 30, 2009); S.C. Res. 1820, ¶ 12, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/1820 (June 19, 2008).
34. Focus Areas, UN WOMEN, http://www.unwomen.org/focus-areas/ (last visited
Nov. 6, 2012).
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First, the justice claim is the most compelling and most common
argument for women’s participation in politics.35 Political decisionmaking has implications for the entire polity.36 Women constitute half
of the polity, and hence the exclusion of women from that decisionmaking is manifestly unjust. If politics were organized in a truly fair
and open manner, one could reasonably expect the roughly equal presence of men and women within democratic structures. The justice
argument is regarded as the most theoretically “pure” argument for
women’s increased participation in politics because it says nothing
about what difference this more equal representation of women will
make.37 The justice argument relates only to the physical presence
of women, and not to the inclusion of specific policy issues or ways of
conducting politics typically attributed to women.38 By avoiding claims
about what women’s participation will substantively bring to politics,
the justice argument avoids creating ideal types of womanhood as
uniformly caring, or conciliatory, or unmotivated by self-interest.39
When applied to processes for dealing with the past, the justice
argument confronts an obvious obstacle in that dealing with the past
is not necessarily understood as the concern of all members of the
polity the same way that politics is understood as such. Many would
argue that victims, however defined, should have stronger moral
claims for inclusion in this process.40 Others would argue that the
“buy-in” of formerly warring parties is needed to ensure an effective
and inclusive process for dealing with the past.41 Feminists would
argue that to acknowledge only formerly violent actors as stakeholders in dealing with the past structurally excludes women, given
their statistically lower presence amongst armed actors.42 Moreover,
many feminists argue that women were victims of the conflict, but
recognizing their victimhood requires a broader understanding of
harms than that which currently underpins most official processes
to deal with the past.43
Hence, in dealing with the past, the justice claim links to a
broader set of debates over what constitutes “the past.” In this way,
it differs from deploying the justice claim for women’s participation
35. See ANNE PHILLIPS, THE POLITICS OF PRESENCE 63 (1995).
36. Id. at 81.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See id. at 64.
40. See RAMA MANI, BEYOND RETRIBUTION: SEEKING JUSTICE IN THE SHADOWS OF
WAR 90 (2002).
41. Id. at 91.
42. See Bell & O’Rourke, supra note 15, at 25.
43. Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, Sex-Based Violence and the Holocaust—A Reevaluation of
Harms and Rights in International Law, 12 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 43, 44 (2000).
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in elected fora. In the context of Northern Ireland, for example, should
the human rights violations of state actors be the priority or exclusive
concern of official efforts to deal with the past? Alternatively, should
the deaths and community intimidation perpetrated by paramilitaries be the priority focus? Does the past refer to the most recent
period of political violence, or to the preceding several hundred
years of ongoing political tensions and violence? In practical and
legal terms, this debate is reflected in disagreements about the appropriate international legal framework for examining culpability
in the conflict. Is international humanitarian law, which recognizes
the political violence in Northern Ireland as an internal conflict within the parameters of Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions,44 and
the Irish Republican Army as combatants in that conflict, the appropriate frame? Or, is international human rights law, in which the
state responded to criminal violence of pro- and anti-state paramilitaries, the appropriate frame? Deciding which international frame
to apply fundamentally impacts which violations we bring into view
when dealing with the past. It is difficult to disentangle the justice
claim for women’s participation in dealing with the past, without
entering into the fraught political terrain of just what constitutes
the past. This is terrain around which there may be little unity
amongst women, women’s movements, or feminists.
Second, the different agenda claim is motivated by a concern for
the political interests that are excluded from decision making when
women are excluded from elected fora.45 The claim, which carries
great intuitive appeal, is that gender is critical in determining one’s
employment status, income level, leisure time and activities, and caring role and responsibilities.46 Women are disproportionately represented in low-wage, insecure, and part-time work, and they bear the
disproportionate burden for caring for young and elderly dependent family members.47 Where women are excluded from politics,
the quotidian material concerns that emerge from this precarious
employment situation, greater levels of poverty, and heavy caring
responsibilities, are unlikely to be priorities on the political agenda,
or adequately understood by those formulating political prescriptions
to related social problems.48 The claim is, therefore, that greater participation of women in politics would give rise to a “different agenda”
44. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating
to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), opened
for signature Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S 17513.
45. See PHILLIPS, supra note 35, at 66.
46. See id.
47. See id.
48. See id.
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in formal politics, one more concerned with the daily material concerns of childcare and family welfare, and the provision of basic
goods to all.49
The different agenda claim is both logical and compelling. It
resonates with most people’s own experience of typical gender roles
in daily life. It is therefore, as Phillips observes, “an argument from
political realism.” 50 The different agenda claim transfers well to demands for women’s inclusion in processes to deal with the past. There
is now broad scholarly and official recognition—at the UN level at
least—that gender is one of the most significant determining factors
in one’s experience of conflict.51 This has marked an important starting point for greater policy emphasis at the UN level on the need for
the inclusion of women in peace processes, peace negotiations, and
transitional justice processes,52 in order to ensure that these different
experiences of conflict are represented in relevant decision-making.
The different agenda claim is not, however, without its own internal inconsistencies and shortcomings. Most ominously, it carries
the shadows of both the theoretical and practical consequences of
essentialism. To briefly rehearse the dangers of essentialism here:
essentialist beliefs reinforce stereotypes; trap the individual in the
images traditionally held of the group; make it hard for those individual to treat their identities flexibly and performatively; deemphasize the lines of division within groups, to the advantage of
dominant groups within the group; and harden lines of division
between groups.53 Most seriously, if an agenda of issues can be presumed to be included with the mere inclusion of women, would it
not be possible to simply ensure the inclusion of this agenda, without necessarily going so far as to require the inclusion of women
themselves? Is it appropriate and/or desirable that women alone
should be regarded as uniquely capable of articulating this agenda?
Are men not too easily relieved of any responsibility to articulate
and defend what are perceived to be “women’s interests”? Are women
precluded from commenting on other issues that do not belong to a
“different agenda,” such as fundamental tensions around what temporal period should be investigated, or what legal frame should be
applied? The shortcomings noted in the different agenda claim caution against the easy conflation of women with any particular set of
49. See id. at 67.
50. Id. at 66.
51. See U. N. SECRETARY-GENERAL, WOMEN, PEACE AND SECURITY, at ix, 4 U.N. Sales
No. E.03.VI.1 (2002).
52. See id. at 1.
53. Jane Mansbridge, Quota Problems: Combating the Dangers of Essentialism, 1
GENDER & POL. 622, 623 (2005).
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issues, in particular when those issues are regarded as tangential
or unimportant to an official process to deal with the past in a postconflict society. Ironically, the idea that women bring a “different
agenda” of issues to processes to deal with the past might in fact reinforce the basis for their continued exclusion from such processes.
Third, the politics of care claim appeals to women’s presumed
“essential” capacity and proclivity for care work. The claim is that the
political system should be reordered to emulate the caring relationship between mother and child.54 Such a reordering would privilege
the alleged maternal values of caring and selflessness.55 According
to the politics of care claim, the greater number of women in politics
would result in a qualitative transformation of politics away from the
self-interest and individualism that motivates most contemporary
political demands and towards a selfless and cooperative politics
belonging to a higher moral order.56
Applied to dealing with the past, it is submitted that the “politics
of care” claim manifests in the following distinct ways: it claims
that, due to their natural caring role, women will invariably privilege “caring” concerns about the material well-being of dependent
family members over “selfish” political concerns of, for example, retributive justice.57 Further, the “politics of care” claim manifests in
claims that women are uniquely capable of transcending “base” political concerns of ethnic identity and national aspirations in order
to identify and pursue the common material interests of a divided
society.58 Finally, the “politics of care” claim works to confirm women’s
inherent capacity and natural proclivity for peacemaking.59 Thus,
unlike the presumed masculine tendency to continue re-fighting the
old war through the now non-violent contestation around the metanarrative, women are believed to prefer a conciliatory stance and to
seek common ground between politically opposed parties in political
efforts to deal with the past.60
Unsurprisingly, the politics of care claim is controversial in feminist theoretical reflection on the importance of women’s greater political participation. Feminist theorists such as Sara Ruddick and
Jean Elshtain are in a minority in advocating this notion of “social”
54. See JEAN B. ELSHTAIN, PUBLIC MAN, PRIVATE WOMAN: WOMEN IN SOCIAL AND
POLITICAL THOUGHT 349–50 (1981); Sara Ruddick, Maternal Thinking, 6 FEMINIST STUD.
342, 361 (1980).
55. See Ruddick, supra note 54, at 360.
56. See PHILLIPS, supra note 35, at 73.
57. See id. at 73–75.
58. See id. at 74.
59. See id.
60. See id.
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or “maternal feminism,” in which the caring and selflessness of the
maternal relationship would be privileged and located at the center
of the political organization of the state.61 Mary Dietz argues that the
generous care given to dependent children by mothers is a poor basis
for a political system built on fundamental political equality and mutual respect.62 Phillips contends that the politics of care is problematic both because it is founded on women’s supposed superiority over
men, and because it “loads too much on women’s role as mothers.” 63
In terms of dealing with the past, the problem with politics of
care as the basis of any claim for women’s inclusion in decisionmaking is the extremely restrictive terms of inclusion that result.64
The politics of care constructs ideal types of women—as peacemaking,
as carers of the community, and as transcendent of political divisions—
that are impossibly onerous to fulfill, yet must be met as a precondition to women’s participation in dealing with the past. Moreover, these
ideal types preclude women from expressing views that reflect—
rather than transcend—ethnic or national loyalties, a desire for retributive justice, or that are unconnected to material concerns of
family or community welfare.65 Such ideal types provide little space
for the participation of, for example, former women combatants, or
indeed any woman whose political subjectivity is grounded in a nonmaternal role or identity.66 Ironically, therefore, the politics of care
claim may in fact reinforce the exclusion of most women from processes to deal with the past.
Finally, the larger dream claim for women’s greater participation
in decision-making links women’s participation to a broader project
of “increasing and enhancing democracy.” 67 The claim for representation is not just aimed at the inclusion of women, but at transformative feminist engagement with politics. The hope is that by changing
the players the nature of the game will change in turn, thereby allowing a different set of priorities to emerge. Because women predominate
61. See O’Rourke, supra note 14, at 140–41.
62. Mary G. Dietz, Citizenship with a Feminist Face: The Problem with Maternal
Thinking, 13 POL. THEORY 19, 31–32 (1985).
63. PHILLIPS, supra note 35, at 75. It should be noted that the politics of care claim
has evolved in feminist theory, moving away from its essentialist origins that assume
women are uniquely talented at care work, to seek political recognition of care work as
important per se, irrespective of who conducts that work. Joan Tronto, Beyond Gender
Difference to a Theory of Care, 12 SIGNS 644, 662 (1987).
64. See Tronto, supra note 63, at 646–47.
65. See id. at 662.
66. Pascha Bueno-Hansen, The “Other’s” Burden of Being for the Nation: Representations of Women in the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Presentation at the
International Studies Association Annual Convention Panel Presentation (Feb. 15, 2009).
67. PHILLIPS, supra note 35, at 189.
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in local community-based politics and civil society organizations, the
“larger dream” is that the greater inclusion of women in politics will
alter the balance between citizens and representatives in modern
democracies.68 Citizens will be empowered to express their interests
and preferences for formal democratic fora through local groups and
organizations. Thus, claims for women’s greater participation in politics are linked to aspirations for a more participatory style of democracy, which is also more deliberative.69 Through greater participation
of citizens and civil society, representing a range of different perspectives, politics will enable greater deliberation and negotiation from
people in different positions.70
Applying the larger dream claim to official processes to deal
with the past would suggest a more inclusive, broad-based, and participatory process that includes all stakeholders (broadly defined)
and allows for deliberation amongst those of traditionally opposing
positions. This process is transformative—rather than bureaucratic—
with an expansive—rather than narrow—understanding of the past
and past harms.
III. WHY DOES WOMEN’S PARTICIPATION MATTER?
MAPPING CLAIMS IN WOMEN’S ACTIVISM
This section turns to testing the theoretical claims made in
Part II. The discussion of theory suggests several avenues for empirical investigation, chiefly: how are claims for women’s participation
in dealing with the past grounded in practice? And do these claims
work, in terms of securing women’s participation in such processes?
The uniqueness of feminism as being both a body of theory and a
movement has long been recognized as one of its defining characteristics.71 Indeed, the difficulty of feminism’s position in theory and the
academy has been attributed to its dual political ambitions: feminist
theory is critiqued within the academy for its overly political objectives, while it is also critiqued by feminist activists for its embedment within a masculinist academy and doctrine.72 Further, the idea
that feminist theory should be assessed for its value on the ground
in transitional societies, where the need for gender justice (however
defined) is most acute, is neither radical nor new. Feminist theoretical
68. See id. at 189–90.
69. Id. at 190.
70. Id.
71. See, e.g., Vicky Randall, Feminism, in THEORY AND METHODS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE
109, 110 (David Marsh & Gerry Stoker eds., 2nd ed. 2002).
72. Elizabeth Grosz, A Note on Essentialism and Difference, in FEMINIST KNOWLEDGE:
CRITIQUE AND CONSTRUCT 332, 332 (Sneja Gunew ed., 1990).
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activity is characterized not just by an attention to theoretical coherence, but also by an aspiration to political utility. Or, as Bottomley and
Conaghan note: “the strength of feminist jurisprudence is tested not
by claims to internal coherence but rather by an ability to deliver.” 73
As noted in the introduction, in global terms, the feminist emphasis
on process and participation emerged from recognition of the internal diversity and disagreement within women’s movements, and the
need to forge unifying demands in the context of women’s divergent
experiences and priorities.74 It is reasonable to inquire, therefore, to
what extent do feminist theoretical claims for women’s participation
hold the center of women’s movements and effectively underpin unified women’s demands on processes to deal with the past.
Northern Ireland is arguably the site for the exploration of the
tensions around demands for women’s participation in dealing with
the past.75 The peculiar ad hoc76 and piecemeal approach adopted to
dealing with the past in Northern Ireland, combined with substantial
activism by women throughout the period of the conflict, the peace
process, and its aftermath, make Northern Ireland a particularly useful site to explore claims and tensions around women’s participation
in dealing with the past. The comprehensive peace agreement of 1998,
the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement (the Agreement),77 underpinned
institutional transformation and political consensus sufficiently to
bring about a sustained end to conflict violence.78 The Agreement involved the British and Irish governments, Northern Ireland political
parties, including an all women party, and political representatives
of paramilitary groups.79 The Agreement provided for a new legislative assembly with a consociational executive; new state institutions
for the protection of equality and human rights; substantial reform
to the institutions of criminal justice and policing; a new relationship between Northern Ireland, the Republic of Ireland, and Great
Britain; and made the constitutional status of Northern Ireland subject to the principle of consent.80 However, the political consensus
necessary to underpin the new institutional arrangements of the
jurisdiction only extended to forward-looking reforms. Regarding the
73. Anne Bottomley & Joanne Conaghan, Feminist Theory and Legal Strategy, 20
J.L. & SOC’Y 1, 1 (1993).
74. See LISA BALDEZ, WHY WOMEN PROTEST: WOMEN’S MOVEMENTS IN CHILE 2 (2002).
75. See supra Part I.
76. Bell, supra note 30, at 1106.
77. Agreement Reached in the Multi-Party Negotiations, Apr. 10, 1998, available at
http://www.dfa.ie/uploads/documents/Anglo-Irish/agreement.pdf [hereinafter Good Friday
Agreement].
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
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past, the causes of the conflict, or even a deliberate bespoke process
to provide accountability for past harms, there was no comparable
consensus between parties to the Agreement.81 Instead, accountability in Northern Ireland has been pursued through a series of individualized, legalized, expensive, state-led, and highly contested trials,
public inquiries, police investigations, and inquests.82 In Northern
Ireland, dealing with the past has dominated political life long into
the post-settlement terrain.83 Political decision-making in the jurisdiction remains dominated by unresolved questions concerning past
wrongdoings. Questions such as the following bleed into contemporary decision-making around ostensibly non-contentious issues, such
as the location of social housing: Who were the wrongdoers? What
were the wrongs? Which wrongs were in fact right given the political
circumstances?84 Moreover, police inquiries and active prosecutions
for conflict-related deaths continue to destabilize fragile inter- and
intra-community consensus about the political process.85
Since the re-escalation of conflict in the 1960s,86 women’s organizing has been a mainstay of the jurisdiction.87 However, the emergence and evolution of women’s civil society organizations in Northern
Ireland has not been immune to the political divisions that structured
violent conflict in the jurisdiction.88 Rather, women’s civil society organizing in Northern Ireland has been very largely determined by
these prevailing political divisions.89 As Rick Wilford has observed:
“[E]fforts to forge [a united] women’s movement in Northern Ireland
ha[ve] foundered over the mutually reinforcing cleavages of nationality and religion. . . .” 90 The fraught political backdrop of ethnic
81. The Agreement contains no express provision for mechanisms to deal with the
past, but contains the need to move on from conflict. See Good Friday Agreement, supra
note 77, at art. 2–4.
82. See Bell, supra note 30, at 1138–39.
83. See id. at 1116.
84. See Noel McAdam, Row Over Housing Plan for Old Army Base at Belfast
Interface, BELFAST TEL. (Mar. 15, 2011), http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/local
-national/northern-ireland/row-over-housing-plan-for-old-army-base-at-belfast-interface15114234.html.
85. See, e.g., Owen Bowcott, Belfast Riots: A Setback for Area Barely Reshaped by
Peace Process, THE GUARDIAN, June 22, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2011/jun/22
/belfast-riots-setback-peace-process (reporting that local discontent at investigations by
the historical inquiries team a factor in causing unrest).
86. See, e.g., MCGARRY & O’LEARY, supra note 25, at 195 (noting that the conflicts in
Northern Ireland began in the late 1960s).
87. Carmel Roulston, Gender, Nation, Class: The Politics of Difference in Northern
Ireland, 18 SCOTTISH AFF. 54, 65 (1997) (noting that a women’s movement has always
existed in Northern Ireland).
88. Id. at 56.
89. Id. at 60.
90. Rick Wilford, Women and Politics in Northern Ireland, in 49 PARLIAMENTARY AFF.
41, 41 (1996).
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divisions, intercommunal violence, and routine presence of highly
militarized security forces, meant that women’s mobilization in
Northern Ireland during the conflict came to be defined by practical
cooperation of women on issues of material survival for the family
and community.91 Hence, rather than a “women’s movement” per se,
Northern Ireland has been home to a “women’s sector” since the
1970s.92 This “women’s sector” consists of a large network of organizations of, and for, women, defined not by their avowed feminist commitments, but by their common concern for material survival issues
of women and families.93
Unsurprisingly, feminist actors and women’s organizations more
broadly have attempted to enter and influence this ongoing debate
about whether and how to deal with the past in Northern Ireland.94
Also unsurprising is the consistent emphasis on the importance of
women’s participation in the process of dealing with the past within
these interventions by women.95 However, in making these interventions, local women have also been forced to confront both the difficulty of forging any kind of unified position amongst women on how
to deal with the past and the limited terms on which women’s inclusion in debates on how to deal with the past is permitted and valued.
In their demands for participation in practice, they have confronted
the tensions foreshadowed in theory.
Data and Framework for Analysis: The remainder of this section
details and analyzes the findings of the empirical research undertaken for this article. The most prominent reports and policy documents of women’s organizations concerned with dealing with the
past were the subject of close textual reading and thematic coding.96
Demands for women’s participation in dealing with the past were
identified in the documents, and the underpinning claims were
91. See id. at 48–49.
92. See Eilish Rooney, Political Division, Practical Alliance: Problems for Women in
Conflict, 6–7 J. OF WOMEN’S HIST. 40, 45 (1995).
93. See id.
94. See Bell, supra note 30, at 1128. WOMEN’S RES. & DEV. AGENCY [hereinafter WRDA]
& WOMEN’S CENTRES REG’L P’SHIP [hereinafter WCRP], WOMEN AND THE CONFLICT:
TALKING ABOUT THE “TROUBLES” AND PLANNING FOR THE FUTURE (2008), available at
http://www.wcrp.org.uk/cms/data/upimages/Women_&_ConflictReport.pdf; WRDA, Grant
Application Form, Limited Call Application, EU Programme for Peace and Reconciliation
in Northern Ireland and the Border Region of Ireland 2000–2006 (Mar. 13, 2007) (copy
on file with author); A RESPONSE TO DEALING WITH THE PAST, supra note 2; RELATIVES
FOR JUSTICE, WAVE TRAUMA CENTRE, & COISTE NA N-IARCHIMÍ, REPORT OF THE WORKSHOP ON 4TH DECEMBER 2010 IN EUROPA HOTEL BELFAST TO INFORM THE IRISH NATIONAL
ACTION PLAN FOR UN RESOLUTION 1325 (Dec. 4, 2010) (copy on file with author) [hereinafter WORKSHOP].
95. See infra Part V.B.
96. See sources cited supra note 94.
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recorded according to the justice, different agenda, politics of care,
and larger dream claims discussed earlier.
Findings and Analysis: Clear patterns cut across different levels
of the advocacy under review. Across the interventions, the absence
of women in formal politics in Northern Ireland is a principal point of
entry. We see here the clear imprint of the justice claim for women’s
increased political participation in the attention drawn to women’s
political exclusion as an injustice of the past and an unjust legacy of
the conflict: “Thousands of women [were] affected by the conflict and
they don’t have a voice.” 97 This absence of women is contextualized
in terms of the exacerbating impact of the conflict, the limiting effects
of socioeconomic disadvantage on women’s capacity to participate in
public life,98 and the juxtaposition with the abundance of women in
women’s groups that sustained communities during the conflict.99
“Given the high proportion of women affected by this conflict, [we
are] offended and angry that we had to organise this [workshop]
ourselves.” 100 Women’s past experience of political exclusion underpins contemporary claims for their inclusion in dealing with the
past: “Community based Women’s Centres, groups and projects work
tirelessly to meet the needs of women in disadvantaged areas, who
have suffered greatly from the conflict, and continue to suffer its legacy today. We would therefore emphasise again that their voices are
heard and heeded.” 101 This consistent invocation of the justice claim
evidences its unifying power amongst women activists. While there
may be little agreement as to whether the past should be dealt with
per se, what past should be dealt with, and how it should be dealt
with, there is at least consensus that women should be included in
the associated decision-making.
Further, the different agenda claim—that the greater participation of women in the process will bring a new and different set of
priorities to the process due to women’s gender-specific experiences
of the socioeconomic impact of conflict—can be identified throughout
the interventions under study.102 Tellingly, the largest and most
comprehensive of the advocacy documents under analysis is itself
organized around the headings: “Impact on Family Life”; “Impact on
Communities”; and “Issues Today.” 103 The absence of men through
exile, imprisonment, or death, is a prominent narrative in this
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

WORKSHOP, supra note 94, at App. 1, 1–3.
WRDA & WCRP, supra note 94, at 4.
Id. at 5, 34.
WORKSHOP, supra note 94, at App. 1, 1–3.
O’KANE, supra note 2, ¶ 4.5.
See, e.g., WRDA & WCRP, supra note 94, at 109.
Id.
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account of the past.104 The consequent added burden on female
heads of household, in terms of managing families, and in particular, managing family poverty, is discussed.105 “It is arguable that
women have suffered disproportionately as a result of the conflict.
Many were left without partners and were required to maintain
families in very difficult circumstances.” 106 The impact is elaborated
in terms of the increased family responsibilities of girls;107 the shortages of basics; the energy borne disproportionately by female family
members;108 the emotional, time, and resource burden of visiting imprisoned male relatives;109 and crippling concerns for family safety
carried by female heads of household.110 “Fear has been a constant
in women’s lives during the conflict—fear for the physical safety of
their families and themselves, fear of the impacts of the conflict and
fear that their sons would become ‘involved.’ ” 111 This focus on women’s
gender-specific experiences of the conflict, in particular as carers for
family members and stalwarts of the community, resonates strongly with the different agenda claim of feminist political theory for
women’s increased participation. Importantly, these gender-specific
experiences of women are then linked to “priority issues” to be addressed by the state in the policy changes demanded by the women’s
sector. “[In the workshop] women also had the opportunity to consider priority issues requiring immediate attention, on which their
group could campaign if they so desired. Each group had different
priorities, although there was considerable overlap.” 112 The priorities articulated chiefly concerned mental and general health service
provision;113 safer streets and communities (including public transport), with an emphasis on community policing and tackling antisocial behavior; improved education funding and access to education,
community regeneration and job creation; and the improved representation of women in decision-making.114 “By failing to carry out
the required gender-sensitive analysis of the conflict, [official efforts
to deal with the past] render[ ] a range of issues that affect women
and girls in Northern Ireland invisible—such as mental, physical
and reproductive health, domestic violence, sexual violence, coercion,
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

O’KANE, supra note 2, ¶ 3.19; WRDA & WCRP, supra note 94, at 12.
See O’KANE, supra note 2.
Id. ¶ 3.19.
WRDA & WCRP, supra note 94, at 13–14.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 22.
Id. at 14–15; O’KANE, supra note 2, ¶ 3.28.
WORKSHOP, supra note 94, at 3.
Id. at 64.
Id. at 2; WRDA & WCRP, supra note 94, at 58.
See id. at 66–68.
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prostitution, and trafficking.” 115 These priorities, identified in womenled interventions into dealing with the past, therefore, constitute supporting evidence for a different agenda claim that, with the inclusion
of women in dealing with the past, a different set of priorities would
structure such processes.
Thirdly, the politics of care claim—that women’s participation in
dealing with the past will secure the inclusion of actors who are naturally peacemaking, carers of the community, and transcendent of
political divisions—can be traced throughout the data. “A historical
breakdown of communities and families shows how women bonded
during the periods of male imprisonment. Women were the community leaders.” 116 The constant threat of violence and consequent harm
to the community is a discernible strand in the account of the past
emerging from these accounts.117 In particular, the pervasive sense
of insecurity on the streets is raised in many interventions.118 The
damage and loss to the community when people chose to exit the
conflict environment through emigration is observed. Women, as
nurses, also often dealt with the impact of the conflict at the community level,119 particularly in dealing with the aftermath of tragic
events. “Some women who had been nurses during the ’70s, ’80s, and
’90s found themselves dealing with the aftermath of violent events.” 120
Most notably, the suggestion of a common maternal identity unifying
Catholic and Protestant, rural and urban, young and old women’s experiences of the past resonates with a politics of care claim that locates
an essential female caring capacity within a common maternal role.
The common experience of Catholic and Protestant women as mothers
is emphasized:
While the specific focus of women’s worries and fears as mothers
occasionally differed slightly, overall, the sentiments expressed by
rural and urban and Protestant and Catholic women as mothers
across the past four decades shared many similarities.121

More subtly, the politics of care claim can be discerned from the relative invisibility of women who perpetrate violence. “Arrests and imprisonment” are something that happened to “family members,” not
to women themselves.122 The military and paramilitary activities of
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

O’KANE, supra note 2, ¶ 2.6.
WORKSHOP, supra note 94, at App. 1, 5–6.
See id. at 11.
WRDA & WCRP, supra note 94, at 60.
Id. at 24.
Id.
Id. at 18.
Id. at 12; O’KANE, supra note 2, ¶ 3.19; WORKSHOP, supra note 94, at App.1, 1–3.

54

WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW

[Vol. 19:035

women are not noted. Finally, in terms of transcending political divisions, women’s religious identities as either “Catholic” or “Protestant”
are frequently referenced.123 Where divergent positions were adopted
on particular issues, it is noted. For example:
Memories of the arrest and imprisonment of family members
was a strikingly regular feature of many Catholic women’s childhood memories of the ’60s, ’70s and ’80s in particular. Prison
visits featured much less in Protestant women’s stories.124

Interventions such as these provide little context for the diverging
experiences of prison visits of Catholic and Protestant women. These
different experiences of Catholic and Protestant women are caused
by the very different relationship between the respective religious
communities to the state and to the political violence that prevailed in
the jurisdiction.125 While the difference between women is observed,
it is without the attribution of any political significance to that difference.126 This emphasis on shared experience did not emerge in a
political vacuum. Rather, it reflects the terms of engagement that
had been developed within women’s organizing over the long period
of the conflict. In order to achieve practical agreement and shared action on a limited set of policy issues, an unspoken consensus of “don’t
mention the war” had come to define women’s organizing in Northern
Ireland.127 These terms of engagement continue to operate in the context of a fragile peace.128
The larger dream claim, the idea that the meaningful inclusion
of women will democratize and ensure better outcomes of the process to deal with the past, is a thread that runs through all of the
documents, but it is arguably most explicit in the following quote:
There should be specific commitment to societal transformation
rather than a return to the past. This should encompass the systems of inequality that structure and limit women’s participation
in society such as socioeconomic disadvantage. The workshop
participants expressed their fear of recurrence of conflict and felt
that their proposals for dealing with the past and transforming
the future were necessary to ensure that violent conflict did not
happen again.129
123. WRDA & WCRP, supra note 94, at 12.
124. Id.
125. MCGARRY & O’LEARY, supra note 25, at 361–62.
126. See, e.g., WRDA & WCRP, supra note 94, at 69.
127. See Rooney, supra note 92, at 12.
128. Eilish Rooney, Women’s Equality in Northern Ireland’s Transition: Intersectionality in Theory and Place, 14 FEMINIST LEGAL STUD. 353, 356 (2006).
129. WORKSHOP, supra note 94, at 1–3.
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The immediate movement here, from questions of process (participation) to substance (lasting peace), is noteworthy.
In global terms, the feminist emphasis on process and participation emerged from a recognition of internal diversity and disagreement
within women’s movements.130 As this section has shown, participation constitutes a claim that can effectively hold the center amongst
women with different, often divergent priorities in dealing with the
past. Claims for participation were repeated and prominent throughout the interventions by women’s organizations. As this section has
also revealed, demands for participation of women in the process of
transitional justice were overtly linked to a set of substantive outcomes of transitional justice: namely the inclusion of a different agenda of issues, the incorporation of an ethic of care, and the achievement
of a larger dream in dealing with the past.
IV. “AM I THAT NAME?” 131 WOMEN IN THE REPORT
OF THE CONSULTATIVE GROUP ON THE PAST
In addition to forming a unifying issue amongst women, claims
made on an official process to deal with the past also aspire to gain
political traction with the relevant decision-makers. In the parlance
of social movements theory, the internal framing of demands must
be such as to mobilize movement members, but the external framing
must mobilize change in the target constituency.132 This section turns
to this latter question, namely the extent to which demands for participation in women’s movement interventions were effective in securing the desired political outcome in the official process to deal with
the past in Northern Ireland. To what extent did these demands for
women’s participation, as linked to delivering the inclusion of a different agenda of issues, the incorporation of an ethic of care, and the
achievement of a larger dream in dealing with the past, gain traction within official processes to deal with the past?
In 2007, the British government finally announced its intention
to begin addressing the most obvious “missing piece” of the infrastructure of Northern Ireland’s transition from conflict, namely a
bespoke mechanism to deal with the past.133 On June 22, 2007, Peter
Hain, then Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, announced the
130. See supra Introduction.
131. DENISE RILEY, AM I THAT NAME: FEMINISM AND THE CATEGORY OF WOMAN IN
HISTORY (2003).
132. See, e.g., Robert D. Benford & David A. Snow, Framing Processes and Social
Movements: An Overview and Assessment, 26 ANN. REV. SOC. 611 (2000) (providing an
overview of theoretical developments in this area).
133. RILEY, supra note 131, at 22.
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formation of an independent Consultative Group.134 The Group was
asked to:
•

•

•

consult across the community on how Northern Ireland
society can best approach the legacy of the events of the
past 40 years;
make recommendations, as appropriate, on any steps
that might be taken to support Northern Ireland society in building a shared future that is not overshadowed
by the events of the past;
present a report, which will be published, setting out
conclusions to the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, by summer 2008.135

Chaired by Church of Ireland Primate of All-Ireland, Robin Eames,
and by former Catholic priest Dennis Bradley, the Report of the
Consultative Group on the Past is popularly known as the EamesBradley Report (the Report).136 Finalization of the Report was delayed and was finally published on January 23, 2009.137 When published, the Report has three substantive sections: one setting out the
impact of the conflict on society, victims, and survivors; another section reviewing existing processes for dealing with the past; and a
final section proposing a way forward through the establishment of
a single body (the “Legacy Commission”), to combine the disparate
legal and service provision elements of dealing with the past.138
The Report was not a truth commission per se; rather, it was a
conversation about what form truth recovery and broader accountability efforts might take in Northern Ireland. The Consultative
Group did not hold hearings or have the task of collating lengthy
transcripts of manifold individual testimonies. The Consultative
Group was not tasked with agreeing on a definitive account of the
past, the harms that occurred, or the individuals and institutions who
perpetrated those harms. Rather, the Consultative Group met with
interested parties, read written submissions, and on that basis proposed a process and model for dealing with the past.139 In writing their
Report, nevertheless, the Consultative Group adopted and inscribed
a particular understanding of the past that was to be dealt with, the
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Jonathan Doak & David O’Mahony, In Search of Legitimacy: Restorative Youth
Conferencing in Northern Ireland, 31 LEGAL STUD. 305, 325 (2011).
137. REPORT OF THE CONSULTATIVE GROUP ON THE PAST, supra note 3, at 33.
138. Id. at 6–10.
139. Id. at 22.
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harms most acutely requiring redress, and the individuals most entitled to be included in the process of accountability and redress.
Data and Framework for Analysis: The remainder of this section
examines the Report. A close textual reading and thematic analysis
of the Report was undertaken, in which explicit mentions of women
(either in general, or in specific reference to named women) within the
Report were examined. Each general or specific mention of named
women was coded according to the underpinning claim for women’s
participation, namely justice, different agenda, politics of care, or
larger dream. The findings and analysis are presented here.
Findings: Two of the eight Consultative Group members were
women, namely Elaine Moore, an addiction counselor, and Lesley
Carroll, a Presbyterian minister.140 That women were there, but
only as one-quarter of the group, suggests that the justice claim
had very limited traction with those charged with selecting the
Group members.141
The analysis of women’s movement documents in the previous
section revealed the popular association made between the participation of women and the inclusion of a “different agenda” of issues
in dealing with the past, most notably socioeconomic issues. To what
extent did these claims gain traction in the Report? It is possible to
identify some concern with socioeconomic issues in the Report. The
inclusion of Moore, a drug counselor, and Carroll, a woman with a
background in community and youth work, could be seen as an
effort to include the socioeconomic impact and legacy of the conflict
within the concerns of the Group.142 Further, the impact of bombs on
businesses, on deterring tourists, and boycotts of businesses by one
community are documented in the Report.143 However, there is no
acknowledgment of the poverty exacerbated by the conflict, and the
difficulties experienced by families and communities in meeting basic needs.144 The account of the Report bears no relationship to the accounts of “poverty and hardship” articulated in the “Women and the
Troubles” document.145 Moreover, the actual provision for addressing
the socioeconomic legacy of the conflict is worryingly vague.146 There
is a recommendation to establish a bursary of £100 million to address
the “society issues” emerging from the conflict, with a particular
140. Id. Note, however, that neither of the international advisers nor Chairs were
women.
141. To note the non-compliance with UNSC Resolution 1325 would be naive. S.C. Res.
1325, supra note 12, ¶ 11.
142. See id. at 28.
143. Id.
144. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE CONSULTATIVE GROUP ON THE PAST, supra note 3, at 79.
145. Compare id. at 28, with WRDA & WRCP, supra note 94, at 18–19.
146. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE CONSULTATIVE GROUP ON THE PAST, supra note 3, at 28.
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emphasis on the healthcare legacy of the conflict, enhancing the role
of young people in society, and tackling sectarianism.147
The very limited and partial treatment of socioeconomic issues
in the Report makes it clear that the socioeconomic legacy of the conflict was not a priority in this official process to deal with the past.
Issues of socioeconomic harms were unlikely to secure prominence
in any official process to deal with the past in Northern Ireland. The
marginalization of socioeconomic issues and the omission of socioeconomic harms is one of the most profound criticisms of transitional justice.148 Miller attributes this “blind spot” to the understanding
within transitional justice of inequality or structural violence as a
contextual background rather than a central issue in transition.149
The Northern Ireland case is not unique then in the sense that the investigation and redress of the socioeconomic causes, consequences,
and legacy of the conflict was never likely to be meaningfully explored
in the Report. But this is not a gender-neutral oversight, both in terms
of women’s disproportionate exposure to economic disadvantage and
in terms of the prominence given to socioeconomic issues in the interventions by women’s organizations.
The body of the Report is dedicated to dealing with those who
lost their lives in the conflict and the justice demands of their immediate family members. Feminist analysis of truth commissions
criticizes an exclusive focus on killings, because women are underrepresented in this victim group and tend to experience other (often
non-physical) harms in contexts of political violence.150 In practice,
however, killings activate a significant body of international legal
obligations on states, most notably to ensure the effective investigation of killings carried out by state agents.151 Hence, in contrast with
the vague and brief terms in which provision is made for dealing with
“society issues” emerging from the conflict, the recommendations of
the Report concerning alternatives to the ongoing legal processes
that investigate killings by state agents are written in lengthy and
meticulous detail.152

147. Id. at 143.
148. See Zinaida Miller, Effects of Invisibility: In Search of the ‘Economic’ in Transitional Justice, 2 INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 266, 266 (2008).
149. Id. at 266.
150. Ní Aoláin & Turner, supra note 23, at 258.
151. See, e.g., Christine Bell & Johanna Keenan, Lost on the Way Home? The Right to
Life in Northern Ireland, 32 J.L. & SOC’Y 68, 71 (2005); Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, Truth Telling,
Accountability and the Right to Life in Northern Ireland, 5 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 572,
572–73 (2002).
152. REPORT OF THE CONSULTATIVE GROUP ON THE PAST, supra note 3, at 124–58.
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Women are featured among the dead in the Northern Ireland
conflict,153 and they are featured in the Report in that capacity.154
The remainder of this section is dedicated to identifying those women
and revealing the circumstances of their inclusion in the Report.
The Report, although established to provide an alternative to
legal processes, is constructed around a very particular set of largely
legally endowed priorities.155 The UK government is bound by a detailed set of legal obligations concerning the effective investigation
of killings carried out by state agents. These obligations arise from
decisions of the European Court of Human Rights on procedural obligations of the European Convention’s Article 2 on the right to life.156
The Report cited and discussed these cases.157 While these four cases
concerned male victims of lethal force, the controversial 1994 decision of the European Court of Human Rights concerning the use of
lethal force against four members of the IRA in 1988 was the precursor to this jurisprudence.158 Mairéad Farrell was among these
four IRA members.159 Farrell was both a combatant in the conflict,
and also ultimately a victim of the conflict.160 The politics of care
claim suggests that women should participate in dealing with the
past because of their supposed natural proclivity for peacemaking.
Yet, the example of Mairéad Farrell provides a powerful counternarrative to assumptions of women as peacemakers, or as unconnected to the perpetration of violence in the conflict. Gender analysis
of the treatment of women combatants in truth commissions identifies the tendency to focus on the woman’s victimhood (for example,
conflict-related sexual violence), instead of documenting and affirming the woman’s agency as a combatant.161 But in the Report, Farrell
153. See, e.g., Malcolm Sutton, An Index of Deaths from the Conflict in Ireland, UNIV.
OF ULSTER, http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/sutton (last visited Nov. 6, 2012).
154. REPORT OF THE CONSULTATIVE GROUP ON THE PAST, supra note 3, at 60–62.
155. See id. at 14.
156. See Jordan v. United Kingdom, 2001-III Eur. Ct. H.R.; Kelly v. United Kingdom,
2001-III Eur. Ct. H.R.; McKerr v. United Kingdom, 2001-III Eur. Ct. H.R.; Shanaghan
v. United Kingdom, 2001-III Eur. Ct. H.R. Note that McCann v. United Kingdom, 21
Eur. Ct. H.R. 97, 98–99 (1996), is the acknowledged precursor to the Jordan et al. cases
discussed in the Report. See Bell & Keenan, supra note 151, at 72.
157. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE CONSULTATIVE GROUP ON THE PAST, supra note 3, at 116.
158. See Rights Court Says Britain Illegally Killed 3 in I.R.A., N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1995,
http://www.nytimes.com/1995/09/28/world/world-news-briefs-rights-court-says-britain
-illegally-killed-3-in-ira.html.
159. Patrick Smyth, Legal Battle to Bring British to Task for Gibraltar Killing of IRA
Group Nears End, IRISH TIMES, Feb. 20, 1995, at 6, available at LEXIS.
160. Court to Be Told Gibraltar Killing of IRA Terrorists Was Human Rights Violation,
HERALD, Feb. 20, 1995, at 24.
161. Luisa Maria Dietrich Ortega, Transitional Justice and Female Ex-Combatants:
Lessons Learned from International Experience, in DISARMING THE PAST: TRANSITIONAL
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is (albeit posthumously) a rights-holder. Her death and its circumstances activated a substantial set of interlocking legal obligations
that meant that her exclusion from the Report, and from any possible way forward in dealing with the past, was unthinkable. The protagonists of Northern Ireland’s proud tradition of women’s peace
activism, or the women who more prosaically managed daily community survival during the conflict, could make no such claim on
the past nor on official efforts to deal with that past.
The Report grounds its prescriptions for a non-legal alternative
to the existing “landscape of legal processes” in dissatisfaction at the
length of time and cost of the existing legal processes.162 In the review of the “landscape of legal processes” within the Report,163 the
public inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the death of Catholic criminal defense lawyer, Rosemary Nelson, is featured. Nelson
was a prominent human rights solicitor who acted for Republican
paramilitaries and those accused of Republican paramilitary activities.164 She died in a car bomb in 1999, at the hands of Loyalist
paramilitaries, in circumstances that suggested the involvement
of state forces.165
The politics of care claim that underpinned women’s civil society interventions implied that women transcended the political
divisions that structured the Northern Ireland conflict. By contrast,
the case of Rosemary Nelson, targeted for violence because of her
perceived Republican sympathies, demonstrates how entrenched
many women were in the political divisions that structured the
Northern Ireland conflict.
The Report also includes a discussion of efforts to recover the
missing bodies of individuals known to have lost their lives in the
conflict,166 of whom Jean McConville is arguably best-known.167
McConville was abducted, killed, and dumped in an unmarked
grave by a group of IRA men and women in December, 1972.168 Because she was a Catholic woman, and especially as the a mother of
ten children, the case has become emblematic of the IRA’s capacity
JUSTICE AND EX-COMBATANTS 158, 168–71 (2009); FIONA ROSS, BEARING WITNESS: WOMEN
AND THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION IN SOUTH AFRICA 90–93 (2003).
162. Indeed, Chapter 7 of the Report is entitled: “Legal Processes: The Arguments for
Change.” REPORT OF THE CONSULTATIVE GROUP ON THE PAST, supra note 3, at 124.
163. Id. at 111.
164. See Beatrix Campbell, So Who Did Kill Rosemary Nelson?, The GUARDIAN, July 3,
2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2009/jul/04/rosemary-nelson-murder-public-inquiry.
165. See id.
166. See REPORT OF THE CONSULTATIVE GROUP ON THE PAST, supra note 3, at 121–22.
167. See Jean McConville’s Family Welcome IRA Boston Ruling, BBC NEWS, July 9,
2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-18765606.
168. Id.
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for extreme violence.169 Controversy surrounds the reasons for her
death.170 One side argues that her death was punishment for going
to the aid of a British soldier who had been shot; the other side
claims that she acted as an informer for British security forces.171
In either event, it can be argued that McConville was targeted for
violence because of her perceived “betrayal” of the community, by
providing assistance to the opposing military force.172 It is in this
capacity that Jean McConville merits one of the handful of explicit
mentions of women in the Report.
Analysis: This section set out to determine whether the framing adopted by women’s organizations in grounding demands for
women’s participation in dealing with the past in claims of justice,
different agenda, politics of care, and larger dream, gained traction
in official initiatives to deal with the past. The overview and review
of women’s place in the Report identified no substantive discussion
of women or women’s experiences of the conflict as a group. Rather,
isolated, individual women could be identified in the document.
Specifically, five women were identified: IRA combatant Mairéad
Farrell, Republican defense solicitor Rosemary Nelson, disappeared
woman Jean McConville, and the Consultative Group members Lesley
Carroll and Elaine Moore. The Report demonstrates little conviction
in a justice claim, that the participation of women in dealing with
the past is—of itself—an important value in dealing with the past.
Moreover, the Report betrays little interest in the “different agenda”
of socioeconomic concerns articulated by women’s movement interventions and embodied by the women members of the Group. The
almost exclusive mention of women who were deeply embroiled in
the conflict divisions and, in the case of Mairéad Farrell, an agent
of political violence, reveals how little political traction attaches to
the claim that women participate in official processes because of
their capacity for peacemaking, transcending political divisions, or
caring for the community.173
In the case of women included in the Report, it would appear
that inclusion has come at the cost of denying the gender of these
women. By being yet another gender-neutral (read: male) actor of the
169. Who Killed Jean McConville? A Battle for IRA Secrets, NPR, July 15, 2012, http://
www.npr.org/2012/07/15/156811081/who-killed-jean-mcconville-a-battle-for-ira-secrets.
170. Id.
171. These conflicting allegations are documented in a police investigation. POLICE
OMBUDSMAN FOR NORTHERN IRELAND, REPORT INTO THE COMPLAINT BY JAMES AND
MICHAEL MCCONVILLE REGARDING THE POLICE INVESTIGATION INTO THE ABDUCTION
AND MURDER OF THEIR MOTHER MRS. JEAN MCCONVILLE 7 (2006).
172. Maol Muire Tynan, After 25 Years, Hoping to Bury Her Mother at Last, IRISH
TIMES, June 26, 1998, at 9, available at LEXIS.
173. See, e.g., id.
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past, there is no need to interrogate the particular circumstances of
women’s political agency and victimhood during the conflict.174 To
recognize the multiple complex identities of Farrell, Nelson, and
McConville would necessitate de-linking “women” from their traditional gender moorings in conflict settings as peaceful, passive,
carriers/bearers of “community.” 175 It would require some interrogation of men’s perceived protective role of women in particular—
and the community in general—during the conflict.176 To consider
Farrell, Nelson, and McConville as women in a man’s world, women
taking up non-traditional roles in armed defense of community or political interests, would challenge perceived constructions of masculinity in conflict situations.177 The Report avoids any such discussion.178
Rather, “society issues” are confined to sectarianism and the role of
young people in society.179 The types of violent masculinity and passive femininity that are nurtured by violent conflict are not the concern of the official process to deal with the past. The women who are
named and acknowledged within the official process are included in
ways that they most resemble men, and because they most resemble
men.180 By including only women who fit within established categories of political actor, and refusing to acknowledge their distinctive gender, those categories are left untouched and unchanged. Any
transformative potential of the initiative to challenge or subvert
those traditional categories is lost.
V. A WAY FORWARD? ENGENDERING THE PAST,
NORTHERN IRELAND AND BEYOND
On the whole, the significance of the Northern Irish case is in
revealing the limited traction of consequentialist participation claims
within official processes to deal with the past. The framing of claims
for women’s participation in dealing with the past in terms of justice, a different agenda, politics of care, and a larger dream may have
proven effective in holding together diverse women’s organizations
with divergent priorities. This article has shown, however, that this
framing was ineffective in influencing the gendered operation of
official efforts to deal with the past in Northern Ireland.
174. See JOSHUA S. GOLDSTEIN, WAR AND GENDER: HOW GENDER SHAPES
SYSTEM AND VICE VERSA 34–35 (2001).
175. Id. at 48–49.
176. Id. at 34–35.
177. See id.
178. See REPORT OF THE CONSULTATIVE GROUP ON THE PAST, supra note 3.
179. See id. at 17, 38, 138.
180. See id. at 60–62, 111–12, 121–22.
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In terms of why women’s participation matters, the justice claim
is compelling, but it remains problematic because one cannot easily
analogize from claims for political participation in democratic fora
to claims for women’s participation in dealing with the past, without
entering the very heart of the meta-conflict about what past must be
dealt with (an issue around which there may be little unity amongst
women or feminists).181 What difference does women’s participation
make? The evidence examined in this article, in terms of the issues
prioritized in women’s movement interventions, suggests that greater
women’s participation will result in greater attention to socioeconomic issues and a broadening of harms considered in official processes. However, this greater attention to socioeconomic issues may
be piecemeal and de-prioritized by larger legal imperatives that require a focus on deaths and physical harms to the body.182
This article has shown that the conflation of participation as a
question of process with participation as a guarantee of substance
is both problematic in theory and unhelpful in terms of feminist
politics. I conclude by proposing a novel third way that acknowledges
a tentative, though dynamic, relationship between women’s participation as process and substantive outcomes in dealing with the past,
while continuing to ground calls for women’s participation within
justice claims.
A. The Justice Claim: A Politics of Presence and the Need
for Women’s Participation
Despite the weaknesses in demands for women’s presence, empirical studies of women’s mobilization repeatedly demonstrate the
unifying and mobilizing power of those demands.183 This unifying and
mobilizing effect is also evident in the Northern Irish case of women’s
civil society interventions into dealing with the past.184 In the context of historically entrenched divisions along ethnic and other lines
that tend to mark post-conflict societies attempting to deal with a difficult past, the galvanizing effect of presence demands on women’s
mobilization ought not to be underestimated or undervalued.
This article noted that it can be difficult to analogize from the
justice claim for women’s participation in democratic fora to the justice claim for women’s participation in official processes to deal with
181. Marysia Zalewski, Gender Ghosts in McGarry and O’Leary and Representations
of the Conflict in Northern Ireland, 53 POL. STUD. 201, 213–17 (2005).
182. See supra Part III.
183. See BALDEZ, supra note 74, at 2.
184. See supra Part II.
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the past without entering into the meta-conflict about what past
must be dealt with.185 The idea that dealing with the past must be
broad-based, inclusive, and deal with a broad range of harms is not a
politically neutral position. Motivated either by pragmatics, or political ideology, there are many who seek a closed and narrow process
to deal with the past that focuses on a particular set of harms and a
particular (generally either pro- or anti-state) set of perpetrators and
victims.186 Women seeking greater participation in official decisionmaking to deal with the past would be wise to recognize that justice
claims bring with them a particular understanding of the past. This
understanding of the past is not located outside the meta-conflict;
rather, it is at the heart of the meta-conflict, and thus may not have
the support of all women.
If women are to be present in their diversity and divergent
positions on the meta-conflict in official decision-making to deal with
the past, women must be present in significant numbers. Thus, the
implicit emphasis on presence and process within the justice claim
can be a genuine means to recognize women’s multiple positions
within the meta-conflict. Cass Sunstein argues compellingly that
perceptions of legitimate entitlement are always influenced by existing distribution of entitlements.187 Thus, if politics is to be more
than the mere aggregation of existing private interests, it must be
the site for the formulation of new and revised interests based on
deliberation amongst a genuine range of perspectives and positions
in circumstances of political equality. Process-based decision-making
must be open to different and new priorities emerging from that process. Ultimately, the meaningful participation of women may not lead
to an official approach to dealing with the past that prioritizes socioeconomic issues, or any other predetermined set of “women’s priorities,” but that does not necessarily mean that the participation of
women was neither meaningful nor transformative. In invoking a
process-based justice claim, we must abandon any certainties about
what the substantive outcomes of that process will bring.
B. The Different Agenda Claim: A Politics of Ideas and
Articulating What Women Can Contribute
In the review of feminist political theory in Part I, this article
acknowledged that the justice claim, in its most theoretically “pure”
185. See BALDEZ, supra note 74, at 4.
186. See id. at 197.
187. Cass Sunstein, Preferences and Politics, 20 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3, 8 (1991).
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form, tends not to underpin successful demands for women’s participation.188 Demands for women’s participation, without some
grander claims about what substantively that participation will
bring, have historically had little traction on those who hold
power.189 In this section, I tread into the theoretically fraught terrain of what women’s participation might bring to official decisionmaking to deal with the past.
The case study explored in this article, of official and women’s
civil society initiatives to deal with the past in Northern Ireland,
charted the divergent priorities in dealing with the past to emerge
from the respective initiatives.190 These divergent priorities suggest,
though are not conclusive, that processes to deal with the past that
included women in equal numbers would be more attentive to socioeconomic issues of material concern to families and communities.
However, in order to ground any feminist demand for increased participation of women in official processes to deal with the past, these
distinct priorities of women must be historicized within a context of
entrenched gender inequality. The disproportionate concern with
family and community welfare in women-only initiatives to deal with
the past can only be understood in the context of the caretaking role
adopted by women during the period of political violence. As extensive feminist discussion of women’s political interests has revealed,
“interests” have special historical significance and are historically
contingent.191 To reiterate Sunstein’s thesis, these political interests
of women were formulated from a position of entrenched political
inequality.192 By historicizing the different agenda that women bring
to decision-making to deal with the past, it can be distinguished from
a politics of care claim. Most importantly, the circumstances giving
rise to the articulation of women’s “needs” or “interests” in dealing
with the past are interrogated, rather than assumed. Dealing with the
past then becomes a means to open up and challenge historical conditions of gender inequality (such as the gendered division of labor,
acute poverty, particular construction of hyper-masculinity in context of violence), rather than reaffirm “essential” gender stereotypes.
188. See supra Part I.
189. See supra Part III.
190. See, e.g., MCGARRY & O’LEARY, supra note 25, at 1–2.
191. See Irene Diamond & Nancy Hartsock, Comment, Beyond Interests in Politics: a
Comment on Virginia Sapiro’s “When Are Interests Interesting?” The Problem of Political
Representation of Women, 75 AM. POLI. SCI. REV. 717, 719 (1981); Anna G. Jonasdottir,
On the Concept of Interest, Women’s Interests, and the Limitations of Interest Theory, in
THE POLITICAL INTEREST OF GENDER: DEVELOPING THEORY AND RESEARCH WITH A FEMINIST
FACE 33, 35 (Kathleen B. Jones & Anna G. Jonasdottir eds., 1988).
192. See Sunstein, supra note 187, at 8–9.
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C. The Politics of Care Claim: A Feminist Politics
of the Female Body
The politics of care claim is rooted in biological determinism:
because the female body performs particular nurturing functions,
women are innately caring. Thus, a great deal of social meaning is attached to physical functions, and this social meaning (women as caring, selfless, conciliatory) becomes the basis for demands for women’s
greater participation in decision-making.193 Ironically, the common
feminist critique of transitional justice is its over-concern with physical harms to the body, to the exclusion of other types of harms, in particular socioeconomic harms and harms to familial relationships.194
Ní Aoláin argues that, while the physical harm to the body is recognized in transitional justice, the social meaning of that harm is overlooked.195 In Northern Ireland, however, a double paradox is observed:
harms to the body are the focus of official initiatives to deal with the
past (the deaths of McConville, Nelson, and Farrell), but there is no
acknowledgment that those bodies are female and no discussion of
the social meaning of the harm. Meanwhile, women’s civil society interventions focus on the social impact of conflict violence, but make
no mention of the physical harms to the body that motivate official
efforts to deal with the past.196
Feminist theorists are divided on the political relevance of the
female body.197 Feminist legal scholars typically focus on the regulatory and restrictive relationship of law to the female body.198 From
legal constructions of women’s sexuality as passive and submissive,
to the intensive regulation of women’s reproductive capacities, the
feminist project in law has often been most concerned with the liberation of women’s bodies from legal control.199 Feminist political
theorists, by contrast, advocate using the female body to subvert and
reclaim traditional exclusionary and masculinist tenets.200 They note
that it is the disembodiment of the rational self that underpins the
notion of the autonomous rational actor at the center of liberal legal
193. Kathleen B. Jones, Citizenship in a Woman-Friendly Polity, 15 SIGNS 781, 809
(1990).
194. See Vasuki Nesiah, Discussion Lines on Gender and Transitional Justice: An
Introductory Essay Reflecting on the ICTJ Bellagio Workshop on Gender and Transitional Justice, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 799, 805 (2006).
195. Ní Aoláin, supra note 43, at 80.
196. See NESIAH, supra note 18, at 800.
197. See, e.g., CAROL SMART, FEMINISM AND THE POWER OF LAW 90 (1989).
198. Id. at 93–94.
199. See id.
200. Belinda Carpenter, The Prostitute and the Client: Challenging the Dualisms, 2
WOMEN’S STUD. INT’L F., 387, 393–94 (1998).

2012]

DEALING WITH THE PAST IN A POST-CONFLICT SOCIETY

67

paradigm.201 The notion of the autonomous rational actor, capable
of individual choice, and free of state interference, has been fundamental to abstract notions of equality.202 To combat this reasoning,
feminists have drawn attention to the multiple bonds of relationships
and familial duties, and issues of physical vulnerability, that bind
the individual in practice.203 Genevieve Lloyd observes: “Wom[e]n
qua wom[e]n [are the] symbol of attachment to individual bodies,
private interests and natural feeling . . . .” 204 Thus, the feminist
politicization of the body has been integral to feminist politicization
of women’s everyday lives, and by extension, the politicization of the
normal, routine, quotidian harms that occur within the private
sphere of family and home.
This article advocates a feminist politics of the female body.
While grave concerns are justified about the limiting and exclusionary archetypes of womanhood that emerge from the traditional
politics of care and the equation of the female body with bonds of
relationships, there is enormous value in opening up the private
sphere of family and home to scrutiny in dealing with the harms of
the past. A feminist politics of the female body would bring into view
the public harms to the body that motivate official processes to deal
with the past (such as the deaths of McConville, Nelson, and Farrell),
but it would also bring into view the perceived “private” physical
harms to women’s bodies, such as domestic violence, restrictions
on women’s reproductive autonomy, and the negative health impact
of poverty.
D. The Larger Dream Claim: A Feminist Politics of
Difference and Democracy
In their own ways, each of the claims in this section for women’s
participation in official decision-making to deal with the past have
been linked to the larger dream claim. The reformulated justice claim
focuses on inclusion and deliberation amongst equals.205 The reformulated different agenda claim emphasizes the need to historicize
the “different agenda” that women bring to decision-making, so official processes to deal with the past challenge, rather than reaffirm,
existing inequalities.206 The reformulated politics of care claim points
201. See id.
202. See id.
203. See id.
204. Genevieve Lloyd, Selfhood, War and Masculinity, in FEMINIST CHALLENGES: SOCIAL
AND POLITICAL THEORY 63, 76 (Carole Pateman & Elizabeth Gross, eds., 1986).
205. See supra Part I.
206. See supra Introduction.
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to the need to open up public and private harms of the past to scrutiny in official processes to deal with the past.207
In this final reformulation of claims for women’s participation,
I engage with the troublesome theoretical shadow that has lingered
over the other claims, namely: is it possible to represent the interests and views of a group as diverse as women in official decisionmaking to deal with the past? The silence around women such as
Mairéad Farrell, Rosemary Nelson, and Jean McConville in crosscommunity women’s civil society initiatives to deal with the past in
Northern Ireland poses obvious, yet incredibly difficult, questions
around: just who represents whom in claims to represent “women”
in decision-making? With what authority are those claims made?
Ultimately, it is submitted, a principled feminist commitment
to internal democracy and respect for difference provides the most
promising basis for claims for women’s participation in decisionmaking to deal with the past. The principled commitment to internal democracy would value and respect the expression of dissent.
While difference and dissent may ultimately give rise to division,
this is the nature of politics. The difficulty of respecting the right of
others to espouse different opinions, while laying claim to the same
political identity of woman or feminist, is not underestimated. However, making women’s participation in official decision-making to
deal with the past contingent on the exclusive articulation of family
and socioeconomic concerns has, firstly, limited effective traction
on official processes, and, secondly, substantially undermined the
transformative potential of women’s participation in dealing with
the past.

207. See supra Part I.

